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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHTS
OVERVIEW

In the area of constitutional law, a majority of the cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stemmed from civil rights actions, under
either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. Other constitutional issues presented to the appellate
court this past year included Indian rights, laetrile availability, the commerce clause, and abortion funding.
I.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a number of cases during
the 1979-80 term involving allegations of violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' The court used this opportunity to clarify and refine its
position in several areas unique to Title VII. Due to a multiplicity of issues
in a number of the cases, the decisions are discussed under headings corresponding to the relevant issue of the case.
A.

The Prima Facie Case

The central issue in each of the cases discussed in this subsection was
whether the claimant had established a prima facie case under the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.2 Each Title
VII case decided by the Tenth Circuit during the recent year which included
a major discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test was included in the survey to
assist the Tenth Circuit practitioner in understanding the court's application
of the prima facie standards to a variety of fact situations.
In Romero v. Union Pacif Railroad,3 the Tenth Circuit court reversed a
decision of a district court which had ruled that the plaintiff, a MexicanAmerican, had not established a prima facie violation of Title VII. Upon
motion for summary judgment, the trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's
discrimination charge because the court found that the plaintiff was not
qualified for the job.4 The Tenth Circuit court, in an opinion written by
Judge Seymour, held that there was sufficient contradictory evidence in the
record to warrant a further inquiry. Evidence was offered to show that Ro1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
2. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

The Court, in the McDonnell Douglas decision, held that a plaintiff

establishes a prima facie claim of a Title VII violation by showing: (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open, and the employer continued to seek applications from
persons of complainant's qualifications. Id. at 802.
3. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. The trial court found that Romero was not qualified for reinstatement to his former
position because he had not participated satisfactorily in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program sponsored by the employer. Id. at 1306.
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mero was qualified for the job and that Romero had been the subject of
discrimination by his employer. 5 The appellate court reasoned, therefore,
that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court in declaring that the McDonnell
Douglas standards apply both to an accusation of discrimination on the basis
of national origin and to a charge of employer retaliation against an employee for filing a discrimination suit. Additionally, the court of appeals
held that a plaintiffs triumph in a discrimination suit is not a prerequisite to
the successful prosecution of the charge of illegal retaliation. 6 The Tenth
Circuit accordingly refused to uphold the lower court's grant of summary
judgment on the issue of retaliation, finding that because the issue was primarily one of intent and motive, 7 it was not an issue properly disposed of
upon motion for summary judgment.
In Ray v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,8 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the district court's finding that the complainant, a black man, had established a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standards. The
trial court, in adopting the findings of an appointed master, concluded, however, that the employer had articulated a valid business purpose for Ray's
discharge. 9 The trial court reasoned that Safeway, therefore, had countered
the prima facie test established by Ray. 10 Judge Seymour, writing for the
court of appeals, decreed that whereas the plaintiff had failed to introduce
any evidence to show that the business reason articulated by the employer
was a mere pretext for discrimination,"1 the discrimination charge filed by
12
Ray should be dismissed.
In Thornton v. Coey,13 the plaintiff had established a prima facie claim
of racial discrimination by the Oklahoma National Guard because of the
Guard's refusal to hire Thornton, a black, for a position with the State's
Equal Employment Office (EEO). The Guard contended that Thornton
5. Although there was evidence that Romero had participated satisfactorily in the employer's rehabilitation program, it had taken 15 months to reinstate Romero to his former position. In contrast, a white employee who had participated in the employer's program had been
reinstated in 120 days. Id. at 1309.
6. 615 F.2d at 1307 (citing Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1977)).
7. Id. at 1309 (citing Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp.
1208 (S.D. Tex. 1977) and Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
8. 614 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. Safeway alleged that Ray had been discharged for insubordination. Ray had refused
to accept a job assignment change which was necessitated by a personality conflict between Ray
and another employee. Id. at 730.
10. The McDonnell Douglas Court held that once a prima facie claim of discrimination has
been established, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S. at 802.
I1. Under the McDonnell Douglas test, if a court is satisfied that the employer has countered
the prima facie claim by articulating a valid business reason for the employee's rejection, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the business reason offered by the employer is merely
a pretext for discrimination. Id.
12. The appellate court suggested that the plaintiff could have established that the business excuse was a mere pretext for discrimination by showing that white employees, in substantially similar circumstances, were treated differently than Ray, or by showing that the employer
had a general policy and practice of treating black employees differently than white employees.
614 F.2d at 731.
13. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980).
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was not qualified for the position, and, in the alternative, the Guard asserted
that the person hired for the job outranked Thornton. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Seymour, rejected the employer's contention that Thornton was unqualified for the position. 4 The
court also rejected the business purpose excuse articulated by the Guardthat the appointment was based on a ranking system. The Guard had used
a rating procedure which the court found, under the Griggs test, 15 to be in
violation of Title VII.
In EEOC v. FruehaufCorp., 16 the court of appeals upheld the decision of
the district court which had determined that the EEOC failed to establish a
prima facie case against the employer. The employer had alleged, and the
trial court agreed, that the aggrieved employees were not qualified for the
disputed position of shop foreman. Judge McWilliams, writing for the
Tenth Circuit court, conceded that the EEOC had established a prima facie
case under the McDonnell Douglas standards. Because Judge McWilliams
found that the applicants were not qualified for the position of shop foreman,' 7 he affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The plaintiff in Hernandez v. Alexander'" had established a prima facie
case of national origin discrimination, but because the employer had articulated a valid business reason for the denial of Hernandez' promotion, the
trial court granted judgment for the employer. The employer, the United
States Army, stated that Hernandez had been denied the promotion because
the person promoted had "broader" qualifications than Hernandez. Chief
Judge Seth, writing for the appellate court, declared that the trial court had
applied the correct standard in requiring the employer merely to articulate a
reason for the promotion denial. The court .of appeals stressed the importance of the statements made by the Supreme Court in Trustees of Keene State
College o. Sweeney 9 because of the Court's emphasis on the articulationof business reasons as compared with proof of the absence of a discriminatory motive. 20 The Tenth Circuit opinion contained no discussion of whether
Hernandez attempted to establish that the reason articulated by the employer was a mere pretext for discrimination.
In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc.,2t the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case of sex discrimination. The employer argued that the trial
court erred in its finding of a prima facie case because the plaintiff had failed
22
to establish that a vacancy existed or that she was qualified for a position.
14. The evidence in the record demonstrated that Thornton had received favorable officer
efficiency ratings while he was in the Army, Thornton's academic record showed that he had
specialized in areas particularly well-suited as background for the EEO position, and Thornton's application for the EEO position listed impressive credentials for the job. 618 F.2d at 690.
15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see note 28 infra.
16. 609 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. The appellate court's analysis is confusing. The court assumed that a prima facie case
was established. The court subsequently found, however, that one of the requisite elements of a
prima facie case, under the McDonnet Douglas test, was not satisfied. 609 F.2d at 435-36.
18. 607 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1979).
19. 439 U.S. 24 (1979).
20. 607 F.2d at 923.
21. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
22. The employer argued that there was no position open for the female employee because
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle,
rejected both of the employer's arguments. The appellate court noted that
there had been numerous occasions when the employer had asked the plaintiff to perform responsible duties. Nevertheless, the employer continually refused to promote the plaintiff to positions commensurate with her duties
when ajob opening occurred. Although the court was reluctant to conclude
that the employer had instituted a pattern and practice of discrimination
against women, 23 Judge Doyle was convinced that there had been numerous
specific acts of discrimination by the employer against the individual plaintiff.
In Wttenbrrnk v. Western Electrc Co. ,24 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling which held that the plaintiff had not
been discriminated against by her employer on the basis of sex. The trial
court found that the discrimination charge was based on the plaintiffs sense
of frustration with the lack of upward mobility in her job and that the em25
Relying on an
ployer had not denied her a promotion because of her sex.
26
the plaintiff
that
earlier Tenth Circuit decision, Judge Barrett determined
had not established a prima facie case of a Title VII violation merely because a qualified male employee was promoted rather than plaintiff. Absent
any evidence of discriminatory intent by an employer to deny a female employee a promotion, the fact that a qualified man is promoted over a qualified woman is not sufficient grounds to sustain a claim of sexual
discrimination.
B.

Policies Which Perpetuate Pre-Act Discrimination

In Thornton v. Coffy, 2 7 the Tenth Circuit court ruled that a rating procedure used by the Oklahoma National Guard, when measured under the
Grzggs test,2 8 violated the requirements of Title VII. The Guard had argued
that Thornton was denied the EEO job position because the person who was
hired outranked him. The rating procedure used by the Guard favored applicants who were full time civilian employees. As no black officer had ever
been a full time civilian employee of the Guard, and since the person hired
for the position had been a full time Guard employee since 1956, the court of
appeals found that the rating procedure used by the Guard fell squarely
within the Griggs prohibition. The court concluded that the procedure perpetuated the discriminatory impact of the prior legal segregation of the
29
Guard.
there had been a lateral transfer of another worker into the vacancy. The employer also argued
that the plaintiff was not as well qualified as the person who had filled the position. Id. at 954.
23. See notes 38-40 znhfa and accompanying text.
24. No. 78-1737 (10th Cir. June 7, 1979) (not for routine publication).
25. M., slip op. at 6.
26. Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
27. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980); see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Gr'ggs held that employment practices, procedures, or tests which are neutral on their face cannot be maintained if they operate to
freeze the status quo of prior discrimination. Id. at 430.
29. The Oklahoma National Guard was segregated by law until 1958.
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In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,30 the Tenth Circuit court
held that, under the Griggs test, 3 ' an employer's no-transfer rule violated
Title VII. The employer's no-transfer policy forbade city drivers from transferring to a line or over-the-road driver position. 3 2 Finding that the employer had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against
blacks who had requested an over-the-road position, 33 the court of appeals
held that the no-transfer policy impermissably locked blacks into city driver
positions. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that the no-transfer policy of the employer perpetuated pre-Act discrimination in violation of the
Grzggs mandate.
The employer argued that the Grzgs test was inapplicable in light of
the two recent Supreme Court pronouncements in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans 34 and InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.35 The employer contended that the Supreme Court in these cases carved out two exceptions to the holding in Gr'ggs and that the no-transfer policy of the
trucking firm fell within the exceptions. The Tenth Circuit court rejected
the argument, stating that "[t]here is not the slightest indication in Evans
that the Supreme Court intended to overrule or disassociate itself from the
decision in Grzggs. '' 36 The court of appeals further noted that the Supreme
Court had limited the application of its Teamsters decision to bona fide seniority systems. The court of appeals concluded that the no-transfer policy of
37
the employer fell outside the scope of this limited exception.
C.

A Pattern and Practce of Discrimination

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,38 the government introduced considerable evidence of the employer's company-wide discrimination
against blacks. The government attempted to establish "a pattern and practice of discrimination" in order to set up the evidentiary presumption enunciated in the Teamsters case. 39 In the Teamsters decision, the Supreme Court
explained that once a pattern and practice of discrimination is established,
the rejection of an applicant of the class discriminated against creates the
inference that an employer is pursuing a discriminatory hiring policy. The
burden then shifts to the employer to establish that the individual applicant
40
was denied employment for lawful reasons.
The Tenth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, held that the gov30. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. There was testimony indicating that the over-the-road drivers were paid more than the
city drivers.
33. See notes 38-40 tnfra
and accompanying text.
34. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). The Evans Court held that a discrimination charge which is not
timely filed with the EEOC is considered to be equivalent to a pre-1964 act of discrimination,
and, therefore, the charge has no legal effect.
35. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Teansters Court held that bona fide seniority systems are

protected from Title VII application under § 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
36. 625 F.2d at 928.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
40. Id. at 364.
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ernment had established the Teamsters evidertiary presumption. The court
reasoned that since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
trial court's finding, the employer was rightly found to have established a
pattern and practice of discrimination against blacks. The appeals court
ruled that the trial court had not erred in granting relief to the claimants
without first requiring the government to prove instances of specific acts of
4
discrimination. 1
D.

Dscrmination Charges Against Unions

In Romero v. Union Pacifw Railroad,42 the Tenth Circuit court remanded
the case to the trial court for an evidentiary determination of whether the
employees' union was involved in the alleged national origin discrimination
and retaliation practices of the employer. Considering the fact that union
members had made retaliatory statements against Romero and the fact that
the union worked closely with the employer in the employer's drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, the court of appeals held that there was sufficient contradictory evidence in the record to warrant reversal of the trial
court's grant of the union's motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the
appellate court relied on precedential decisions from other circuits wherein
the courts of appeals have recognized the important role that labor organiza43
tions play in the enforcement of Title VII.
E.

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act

In Fitzgeraldv.Sirloin Stockade, Inc.,44 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to apply the standards of the Equal Pay Act. 45 Although the trial
judge had made a mistaken reference to the Equal Pay Act in his findings,
the appellate court dismissed the employer's attempt to assert the Act on
appeal. Application of the Equal Pay Act would have allowed the employer
to request a jury trial. A right to a jury trial does not exist in cases brought
exclusively under Title VII. Adjudication under the Equal Pay Act also
would have allowed the employer to raise certain standards not available in
Title VII cases.46 The court rejected the employer's attempt to raise the
Equal Pay Act because the trial court had proceeded consistently under Title VII.
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,47 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Seth, rejected an attempt by
41. 625 F.2d at 930.
42. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
43. See Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d.1292 (8th Cir. 1978) (labor organizations have an affirmative duty to insure employer compliance with Title VII); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257
(4th Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (a union
may be held responsible for the discriminatory practices of the employer if the union takes no
action to prevent those practices),
44. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
46. The Equal Pay Act standards, however, are applied in Title VII actions when the issue
of discriminatory compensation arises.
47. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
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several nurses to restructure Denver's classification and pay plan. The
nurses sought to adjust their wages so that their benefits would no longer be
linked to the salaries of other nurses in the metropolitan community. 48 The
nurses alleged that since most nurses are women, the prevailing low wages of
nurses in the community reflected an historic pattern of discrimination
against women. Furthermore, the Denver nurses argued that whereas the
classification and pay plan of the city reflected the low community wages for
nurses, the city's plan discriminated against them. The court of appeals rejected the nurses' claim, stating that the wage disparity articulated by the
nurses was not the type of employment disparity contemplated by Congress
in enacting Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 49 The court declared that an
employee can prevail under these acts only upon showing a differential in
pay between persons doing equal work. The employee must further demonstrate that the differential is based on an unlawful reason. This is the "equal
pay/equal work" concept. As the nurses were attempting to link their job
classifications to employment categories requiring entirely different skills, 50
the court found that they merited no relief under either Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act.
F.

Afjirmatzwe Action Plans

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 5 ' the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned a discretionary ruling of the trial court which had
held that the facts of the case did not warrant the imposition of an affirmative action plan. Recognizing the broad discretion granted to the district
courts under Title VII, the appellate court nonetheless ruled that the employer's history of racial discrimination mandated institution of affirmative
action. The court enunciated five factors to be considered in determining
whether affirmative relief should be granted. A trial court should consider:
1) whether there has been a long history of racial discrimination by the employer or the union; 2) whether the history of the employer's attempts to end
racial discrimination by increasing minority hiring and promotion is relatively short; 3) whether there was any significant change in the employer's
policies before the government filed suit; 4) whether the employer was recalcitrant in voluntarily taking action to correct the imbalances created by past
discrimination; and 5) whether there was any significant improvement in the
employer's practices. 5 2 Given the concentration of blacks in low paying, less
desirable jobs at Lee Way Motor Freight, and given the reluctance of the
employer to alter his employment practices despite two major lawsuits, 53 the
48. The nursing classification and pay plan of Denver placed city nurses on a parity with
other nurses in the community. Id. at 229.
49. As a result of the Bennett Amendment, Title VII mirrors certain provisions of the

Equal Pay Act with respect to discriminatory pay differentials. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1976).
50. The nurses wanted their job classification to be linked to a city classification described
as "General Administrative Series". 620 F.2d at 229.
51. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 944.
53. These two major lawsuits were the instant case, 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979), and
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971).
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appellate court believed that affirmative relief was warranted.
G.

Subject MatterJurisdicton

In Romero v. Union Paciqftc Railroad,54 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the omission of a defendant's name from an EEOC charge does
not require automatic dismissal of a subsequent Title VII action. 55 Recognizing that the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a lawsuit, 56 the court of appeals stated that "complaints to the EEOC must be liberally construed in
order to accomplish the purposes of the Act."' 5 7 As the Tenth Circuit was
confronted with this issue for the first time, the court of appeals referred to
four factors listed in the Third Circuit case of Glus v. C C Murphy Co. 58 as
pertinent to an evaluation of a complainant's failure to name a party before
the EEOC. The Tenth Circuit court instructed the trial court to consider:
1) whether the role of the unnamed party could be ascertained through reasonable efforts by the complainant at the time that the EEOC complaint is
filed; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named party are
so similar to the interests of the unnamed party that, for the purposes of
obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance, it would be unnecessary to
include the unnamed party in the proceedings; 3) whether the party's absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interest
of the party; and 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that the party's relationship with the complainant
is to be through the named party. 59 As this jurisdictional question was one
of first impression, the case was remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of the case in light of the Glus criteria.
H.

Tmely Filhng of Discrimination Charges

In Trujillo v. General Electric Co. ,6 the Tenth Circuit court recognized
that an EEOC district director has the implicit authority to rescind a notice
of right to sue. 6 1 The court thereby preserved the plaintiff's discrimination
charge, which charge would not have been considered as timely filed with
the EEOC had this implicit authority not been acknowledged.
The defendant employer filed a motion to dismiss the Title VII claim
because Trujillo's suit had not been filed within ninety days of the initial
notice of right to sue. 6 2 The EEOC district director had notified Trujillo of
54. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. The issue on appeal was whether the failure of the complainant to name the individual
defendants in the charge brought to the EEOC precluded the district court from exercising
jurisdiction as to the individual defendants. Id. at 1311,
56. Id. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
57. 615 F.2d at 1311.
58. 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977).
59. 615 F.2d at 1311-12.
60. Nos. 79-1071 & 79-1072 (10th Cir. May 29, 1980).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976) provides that the EEOC or the Attorney General shall
notify a Title VII claimant of his right to sue where the Commission or the Attorney General
decides that there is no cause to press a claim on the individual's behalf.
62. A Title VII claimant who has been notified of his right to sue by the EEOC or by the
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his right to sue, but subsequently revoked this notice because of efforts to
attempt a conciliation of the parties. When conciliation failed, the district
director issued a second notice of right to sue. Trujillo had filed his claim
within ninety days of the second EEOC notice, but not within ninety days of
the original notice of the right to sue. The employer claimed that it was
error to allow Trujillo to bring his Title VII claim after the initial ninety
days had lapsed. General Electric argued that the district director is not
authorized by statute to rescind a notice of right to sue and, subsequently, to
issue a second notice.
In reliance upon a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit, 63 Judge
McWilliams, writing for the court, reasoned that a district director has an
implied authority to issue a second notice of right to sue. The judge declared
that because the district director is authorized to reconsider a determination
of "no cause",64 the director has the analogous authority to rescind a notice
of right to sue. To require the EEOC to conciliate within the limitations of
the initial ninety day period would severely restrict the conciliation efforts.
Judge McWilliams concluded, therefore, that the statutory ninety day time
limit should be calculated from the date of the EEOC's second notice of
right to sue.
In Wilkerson v. Siegied Insurance Agency, Inc. ,65 the Tenth Circuit court
ruled that the plaintiff had not timely filed her discrimination charges because she had not filed within the statutory period. The court of appeals
held that the event which triggers the statutory period is the last day that the
employee works. The date on which the employee ceased receiving severance pay or other extended benefits was deemed to have no legal significance. 6 6 The court of appeals relied upon a case decided by the Third
Circuit, Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 6 7 The tribunal was persuaded by the
Bonham court, which noted that if the statutory period during which a Title
VII claimant must bring a claim were allowed to begin to run at the time
the employee is taken off the payroll, rather than at the date when the employment relationship actually terminates, the employer would be penalized
68
for granting severance pay and other extended benefits.
I.

Discovey

The court of appeals remanded the case of Weahkee v. Norton69 to the
district court to permit discovery which the trial court had denied the plaintiff. In a most unusual turn of events, the plaintiff sued his employer, the
EEOC, alleging discrimination on the basis of the employee's national oriAttorney General must file his claim within 90 days of receipt of such notice. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(0(1) (1976).
63. Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) (1979).
65. 621 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1980).
66. The employee argued that her charge was timely filed because it was filed within 90
days of her removal from the company's payroll. Id. at 1044.
67. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
68. 621 F.2d at 1044.
69. 621 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1980).
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gin. The EEOC had invoked a privilege defense in the trial court, claiming
that provisions in the Privacy Act 7° and in the Freedom of Information
Act 7 ' precluded claimant's requested discovery. Claimant had sought to obtain certain personnel files of EEOC employees. In denying the privilege
claims of the Commission, the appellate court reaffirmed the extensive scope
72
of discovery in a Title VII action.
J.

Remedies

In Thornton v. Coffey, 7 3 the Tenth Circuit court overturned the district
court's order which required that the Oklahoma National Guard reinstate
the plaintiff and retroactively promote him to the military rank of major.
While recognizing the wide variety of discretionary powers afforded trial
courts in fashioning appropriate relief, 74 the appellate court cautioned that
courts must strike a balance between their authority to grant remedies and
the judicial policy of nonintervention in internal military matters. 75 The
court of appeals concluded that the remedial powers of the district courts do
not extend to the ordering of military promotions. The court noted that the
remedy was particularly inappropriate because the claimant failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.
In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. ,76 the court of appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court which granted an award of "front pay" rather than
reinstatement. The Tenth Circuit determined that where the evidence in
the record establishes an atmosphere of hostility towards the plaintiff, reinstatement is not a precondition to the award of front pay. Because the evidence indicated that a working relationship between the employee and the
employer would be impossible, the appellate court upheld the remedy of the
77
trial court.
In UnitedStates v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,78 an issue analogous to the
issue raised in the Fitzgeraldcase was considered by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals. The court, concurring with the report of an appointed master,
held that a probationary period is not a prerequisite to an award of back pay
where the claimant has a valid reason for refusing an offer of employment by
the defendant employer. The appellate court reasoned that a mandatory
probationary period could invite harassment by the employer, harassment
designed to encourage the claimant to leave before the probationary period
552a(b)(l 1) (1976) requires that a court order be obtained prior to the repersonnel files.
552(b)(6) (1976) exempts disclosure of personnel and medical files which
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
72. 621 F.2d at 1082 (citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
and EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974)).
70.
lease of
71.
"would

5 U.S.C. §
government
5 U.S.C. §
constitute a

73. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir, 1980).
74. Id. at 691. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
75. 618 F.2d at 691. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
76. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
77. The court relied upon evidence which showed that the employer had questioned the
loyalty of the plaintiff, had reduced the plaintiff's work responsibilities, and had inserted memoranda concerning her poor attitude in her personnel file. Id. at 957.
78. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
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concluded. The court was concerned that employers could thereby induce
79
claimants to forego the conditional back pay award.
The court, in the Lee Way decision, aligned itself with other federal judicial circuits which have ruled that a Title VII claimant is entitled to a back
pay award calculated from the date of injury until the time when remedial
relief is actually realized.80 The Tenth Circuit court rejected the argument
of the employer who claimed that this test would penalize the employer
where lengthy court proceedings are involved. The court countered that because the purpose of Title VII is to make whole aggrieved claimants, any
hardship which may result from lengthy court proceedings should fall upon
the "wrongdoing employer.""' The appellate court added, however, that
the two-year statute of limitations governing the award of back pay should
commence to run on the date when the discrimination charge is filed with
the EEOC under section 706(g) of the Act a 2 rather than from the date of the
government's suit. If the statute began to run on the date of the government's suit, it could work a hardship on claimants because the government
may file charges only upon a showing of a pattern and practice of discrimi8 3
nation by an employer.
K.

Miligaton of Damages

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,84 the Tenth Circuit court
indicated a preference for the individual approach rather than the "best
man" or "average man" approaches to the mitigation of damages question.8 5 Under the latter approaches, the group of employees is held to the
standard of the most successful claimant ("best man") or the average claimant ("average man") in determining whether the individual claimant exercised reasonable diligence to mitigate damages as required by the Act.8 6 Lee
Way Motor Freight argued that it had satisfied the employer's burden of
showing lack of reasonable diligence by the individual claimants who did
not satisfy the standards of either the "best man" or "average man" approach. The appellate court rejected the employer's attempt to apply these
standards, preferring to analyze the good faith mitigation efforts of the
87
claimants on an individual basis.
79. Id. at 938.
80. Id. at 933. (citing EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257
(4th Cir.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)).
81. Id. at 931.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1976).
84. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
85. The individual approach recognizes the efforts of an individual to mitigate damages
rather than the actions of a similarly situated group. The "best man" approach imputes the
interim earnings of the most successful claimant to other claimants similarly situated. The
"average man" approach imputes the average of the interim earnings to those claimants whose
interim earnings are below average. Id. at 937.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
87. 625 F.2d at 938 (quoting NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
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Interest on Back Pay Awards

In Weaver v. United States,88 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the district court, which had ordered the federal government, as the defendant employer, to pay interest on a back pay award. The
reviewing court ruled that because there was no express language in the 1972
amendment-- to Title VII authorizing the award of back pay interest to
federal employees, the lower court was mistaken in awarding interest to
claimants. The appeals court reasoned that absent express congressional
consent to the award of interest to claimants, the award was precluded,
based on the theory of sovereign immunity.
M.

Attorneys Fees

In EEOCv. FruehaufCorp.,90 the Tenth Circuit court overturned the trial
9
court's award of attorneys fees to the successful defendant. ' The appeals
court ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by awarding attorneys fees to the defendant. The appellate tribunal emphasized that there
was insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the action was frivolous,
92
unreasonable, or without foundation in its inception.
In Booker v. Brown,9 3 the court of appeals held that a claimant, who had
prevailed on the merits in his discrimination charge before the Civil Service
Commission, but who was denied compensation for attorneys fees in the administrative proceeding, had standing, as an aggrieved person under Title
VII, 94 to bring an action in the district court to enforce his right to attorneys
fees. The appellate court relied upon a number of cases, decided in other
circuits, which have recognized that the award of attorneys fees is appropriate for services rendered by a claimant's attorney before an administrative
95
agency.
II.

SECTION

1983

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1871

During the past term the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented
with a number of cases wherein there was a claimed violation of section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.96 The claimants alleged violations of constitutional rights by individuals acting under color of law. A significant issue
concerned the availability of good faith as a defense to unconstitutional action of a local governmental body. 97 Other questions arising under section
88. 618 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). This 1972 addition to the statute brought federal employees within the coverage of Title VII.
90. 609 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides that reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded
to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.
92. 609 F.2d at 436 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)). A
prevailing defendant in a Title VII proceeding is to be awarded attorneys fees only when the
court finds that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id.
93. 619 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1980).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
95. 619 F.2d at 60.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
97. Bertot v. School District No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979).
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1983 included the definition of "acts under color of law", the substantive
basis for section 1983 liability, and the interrelationship between state common law remedies and the federal statutory remedies provided by the Civil
Rights Act.
The Effect of the Presence of Good Faith

A.

In Bertot v. School District No. 1,98 the most significant section 1983 decision of the term, the Tenth Circuit court delineated the scope of municipal
liability following the Supreme Court decision of Monell v. Departmentof Social
Services. 99 In the Monell decision, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not entitled to an absolute immunity when sued under section
1983.1°'° The Supreme Court, however, left the task of defining the scope of
any remaining immunity to the lower federal courts.
In its Bertot opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
good faith was not available to the school district 0 1 as a defense in an action
for back pay under section 1983.102 Judge McKay, writing for the majority,
analyzed the history of the Civil Rights Act and the common law immunities, noting that the common law did not provide the same qualified good
faith immunity for public bodies as it did for public officials. 10 3 The judge
explained that the personal immunity doctrine for public individuals, acting
in good faith, is based on two concerns. If an individual in public office fears
personal financial liability bbcause of a mistake in judgment, even though
made in good faith, he or she will be deterred from exercising independent,
forceful judgment. The chilling effect on the decision making process is considered a detriment to the long term public interest.' 0 4 Furthermore, there is
fear that qualified persons will hesitate to seek public office if there is the risk
of personal liability. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit court found that these concerns
06
were not equally applicable when liability is placed on a school board.'
Judge McKay implied that the imposition of section 1983 liability will not
hinder the decision process of the school board members because no board
members will suffer personal financial loss as a result of mistaken judgment.
As a governmental entity, the school board's damage awards will be assessed
against the school board's treasury. The court of appeals evidently considered that the risk of depleting the board funds would not adversely affect the
independent judgments of school board members to the same degree as
would the threat of personal financial loss. The court of appeals emphasized
98. Id.
99. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 701, 713-14.

100.

101. In the Monelt decision, the Supreme Court noted that there was no distinction between
municipalities and school boards for purposes of suit under section 1983. Id. at 696.
102. The court of appeals explained that an award of back pay is an element of equitable
relief. The presence of good faith cannot preclude the grant of an equitable remedy. 613 F.2d
at 250. Judge Barrett in his dissent, however, questioned the majority's labeling of back pay as
a form of equitable relief instead of as compensatory damages. Id. at 255.
103. Id. at 248.
104. Id. at 249.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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that when rights as important as those guaranteed by the first amendment
are violated by the government, it is preferrable to have the costs of the
violation spread among the taxpayers rather than to have the injured victim
0 7
bear the total burden of the unconstitutional action.1
Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett, dissenting, expressed concern
,
.fl
ri f the mainritv's decision. Chief Judge Seth reasoned that as the school board was merely a group of individual officials
acting collectively, any immunities available to the board members as individuals should be available to them as a unit.108 Because the majority's decision required the board to correctly predict judicial interpretation of
constitutional rights, Chief Judge Seth argued that board members should
not have been held to a standard higher than that of good faith in making
such difficult predictions. 109 Judge Barrett expressed concern for the potential financial repercussions of the imposition of section 1983 liability on municipalities which have acted in good faith."1 0

about the ram ;*ft

The majority's reasoning in the Bertot decision was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Owen v. City of Independence.' Il In
the Owen case, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit 1 2 and held,
as did the Tenth Circuit, that good faith is not available to municipalities as
a defense in suits claiming constitutional violations under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.
In another case involving the good faith of the defendant, Love v. Mayor
of Cheenne,1 '3 the Tenth Circuit court held that the prevailing party in a
civil rights action is entitled to an award of attorneys fees under section 1988
of the Civil Rights Act" 4 unless there is a showing of special circumstance
which would render the award unjust. The plaintiffs had successfully challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance," 5s but they were denied attorneys fees. The trial court found that because the defendants had acted in
good faith, an award of attorneys fees would be unjust." 6 The court of appeals reversed, holding that attorneys fees under section 1988 are not contingent upon a showing of good or bad faith. The reviewing court concluded
that the presence of good faith is not a special circumstance rendering unjust
7
an award of attorneys fees.' '
107. Id. at 252.
108. Id. at 253 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 254-56 (Barrett, J., dissenting).

111.

445 U.S. 622 (1980).

112. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). In its Berlot opinion, the
Tenth Circuit court specifically rejected the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's Owen decision.
613 F.2d at 250.
113. 620 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1980).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
115. The ordinance required that persons obtain a permit prior to distributing religious
material from door to door. The permits were issued by the sheriff who had unbridled discretion in approving or disapproving the applications. 620 F.2d at 236.
116. Ad.
117. Id. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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Acting Under Color of Law

In Brown v. Chafe,"18 the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against
several attorneys who had defended him in a prior lawsuit and against Sheriff Chaffee, the plaintiff's co-defendant in the prior lawsuit. Brown and
Chaffee, who was Brown's supervising officer, had been defendants in a civil
rights action in which Brown was found liable for actual and punitive damages. Chaffee had been exonerated. Brown brought the subsequent action,
claiming that he had received inadequate representation of counsel at the
previous trial. Brown alleged that although his interests had conflicted with
Chaffee's, the two police officers were represented by the same attorneys until three months before trial. 1 9 Brown alleged that he was not informed of
the conflict, that evidence favorable to his defense was suppressed, and that
120
the attorneys and Chaffee had conspired to deprive him of a fair trial.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the defendants, holding that attorneys do not act under color of law
merely by representing public officials in private litigation. The appellate
court also ruled that Sheriff Chaffee's defense of his personal lawsuit did not
constitute state action. Brown, therefore, had no cause of action against defendants under section 1983.121
In Norton v. Liddel,' 22 the court of appeals considered whether a private
individual had acted under color of law in conspiring with a state official
who was immune from section 1983 liability. Sheriff Liddel and an assistant
district attorney filed an information charging that the plaintiffs had unlawfully incited to riot.1 23 Plaintiffs alleged that Sheriff Liddel and the assistant
district attorney had conspired to bring the charges in retaliation for plaintiff's lawful exercise of constitutional rights.
In an opinion written by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit court held
that an assistant district attorney is absolutely immune from lawsuits challenging the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion, even if his official actions
were "undertaken maliciously, intentionally, and in bad faith."' 24 The
court of appeals found that Sheriff Liddel, although a public official, had
acted in his capacity as a private citizen when he provided the district attorney's office with facts to support the charges filed against the plaintiffs.
Judge Barrett determined, however, that Sheriff Liddel's status as a private
citizen did not put an end to the section 1983 inquiry. A private citizen who
conspires with a government official to violate another citizen's constitutional rights may be deemed to be acting under color of law so as to make
him liable under section 1983.'25 The conspiracy may implicate the private
citizen even if the official coconspirator is immune from suit under section
118. 612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1979).
119. Id. at 500.
120. Id. at 500-01.
121. Id. at 501.
122. 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 1377.
124. Id. at 1379 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) and Atkins v. Lanning, 556
F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1977)).
125. Id. at 1381.
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1983.126 A sufficient nexus between the immune state official and the private citizen must be established, however, by an examination of their concerted action in the advancement of the conspiracy. 127 Applying this test,
the appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs had established a sufficient nexus
between Sheriff Liddel and the assistant district attorney so as to warrant a
conclusion that Sheriff Liddel acted under color of law in advising the district attorney about plaintiffs' activities. Judge Barrett concluded, therefore,
that the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment was

incorrect. 128
C.

Baszs for Liabity

In actions under section 1983, public officials cannot be held liable, on
the basis of respondeat superior, for the constitutional torts of inferiors. They
can, however, be held liable for the failure to properly train and supervise
their subordinates when such failure results in constitutional violations. In
McClelland v. Facteau,'29 the plaintiff brought suit under section 1983, claiming to be the victim of an illegal arrest. The defendants included the chief of
the New Mexico State Police and the police chief of Farmington, New Mexico. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the two police chiefs,
0
and the plaintiff appealed.13
McClelland claimed that the police chiefs had breached their duty to
adequately train and supervise the officers within their control. In an opinion written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit court recognized that a
breach of duty could form the basis of a section 1983 action provided that
there is an affirmative link between the omission or act of the official charged
and the misconduct of subordinates which precipitated the complaint. The
appellate court noted that, at trial, there had been no disputed issues of fact
13 1
but there were isregarding the training of the offending police officers,
sues of fact concerning the performance of the defendant police chiefs in
supervising their subordinates.' 32 The judgment of the district court was
reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceed33
ings on the issue of supervision.'
In Serna v. Manzano,' 34 two deputy sheriffs filed a section 1983 civil
rights action against their employer, the sheriff, claiming that he had discharged them in retaliation for the exercise of their first and fourteenth
126. Id. at 1380.
127.

Id.

128. Id. at 1380-82.
129. 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979).

130. Id. at 695. The three other defendants, the arresting officers, reached a settlement with
the plaintiff.
131. Both defendant police chiefs presented evidence demonstrating that the training afforded the arresting officers was proper. This evidence was not contested by the plaintiff. Id. at
697.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 698.
134. 616 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1980).
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amendment rights to engage in political activities.'3 5 The Tenth Circuit
court affirmed the district court's finding that the discharge was proper. The
court of appeals reasoned that the dismissal was not based on the political
behavior of the deputies, but rather it was grounded upon the fact that the
accompanying activities 136 had disrupted the efficient operation of the sher13 7
iff's office.
D.

Eaffct of State Law on Section 1983 Actions

A Wyoming school teacher, seeking an award of damages under section
1983, was barred by Wyoming's two year statute of limitations.1 38 In Spiegel
v. School District No. . ,139 the plaintiff alleged that the statute of limitations
was inapplicable because: 1) his claim was for a penalty, and the statute
created an express exception for penalty or forfeiture actions; 2) his action
was not based on a federal statute; and 3) the two year period had not run
because his action was originally commenced in state court within the two
0
year period, which tolled the running of the state statute of limitations.14
In an opinion written by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit court briefly
considered and then dismissed the plaintiffs first two assertions. The appeals court found that the action was indeed based on a federal statute, section 1983. Judge McKay further explained that a claim for punitive
damages does not transform a civil suit into a penalty claim. The court of
appeals also rejected plaintiffs claim that his action in state court tolled the
running of the statute. The plaintiff had argued that the statute should toll
because he was required by law to exhaust state remedies prior to bringing
the section 1983 action.
Relying on two Supreme Court decisions, McNeese v. Board of Education' 4 1 and Monroe v. Pape,'4 2 the Tenth Circuit court reasoned that because
section 1983 actions supplement the remedies available under state law, a
plaintiff is not required to exhaust all possible state remedies prior to bring135. Deputy Sturdevant had decided to challenge Sheriff Manzano in the next election, and
Deputy Serna was acting as Sturdevant's campaign manager. Id. at 1166.
136. Id. The deputies had taped conversations which occurred in the sherifs office for use
in the political campaign. Other employees were aware of the taping which created an atmosphere of tension and distrust in the office.
137. The Tenth Circuit court applied the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The appeals court weighed the right of a
public employee to freedom of expression in matters of public concern against the right of the
state to supervise its employees so as to provide efficient public service.
138. 2 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-115 (1977) provides that "laill actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which no period of limitations is
provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action has
accrued."
139. 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979).
140. Spiegel had successfully challenged his discharge in a state administrative proceeding
which was affirmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court. The plaintiff was reinstated to his former
position and he was in federal court only to seek damages under 40 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a). Id. at 265.
141. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
142. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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ing the federal action.143 The court of appeals recognized that the McNeese
and Monroe decisions were limited to some extent by Huffnan v. Pursue,
Ltd ,144 a case wherein the Supreme Court expressed concern for the comity
principle. Judge McKay stated, however, that in this case the court need not
determine the applicability of the Huffinan rule because Spiegel did not bring
145
his federal action until after the state proceedings were terminated.
Hufman bars a federal 1983 action only where there is a pending state proceeding which concerns the same matter that is the subject of the federal
action.
The reasoning of the court avoided the issue presented. Spiegel argued
that if he had brought his section 1983 action while the state proceedings
were pending, his action would have been barred by Hujlman. Yet, by waiting until the state proceedings terminated, Spiegel's suit was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court refused to decide the hypothetical situation,
stating that Spiegel should have attempted to bring the federal action earlier
which would have allowed the court to decide the applicability of the
14 6
Huffinan rule.
1 47
the district court awarded the plaintiff damages
In Clappier o. F4'nn,
under two theories of liability, one theory based upon common law negligence, the other theory based upon a deprivation of rights under section
1983. The Tenth Circuit court disallowed the double recovery because the
legal theories alleged were merely alternative theories providing for identical
relief. 148

The plaintiff in the Clappier case had been arrested and placed in the
Laramie County jail in Wyoming, where he was mistreated by the other
prisoners. 1 49 Clappier brought suit against the local sheriff, alleging common law negligence for the sheriff's failure to operate the jail in accordance
150
Plaintiff's second claim,
with the Wyoming Constitution and statutes.
was
guilty of cruel and unsheriff
the
based on section 1983, alleged that
15
The trial court
usual treatment in violation of the eighth amendment.
on each of the
recovery
authorizing
submitted two verdict forms to the jury,
claims.
143. 600 F.2d at 266.
144. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). The Hunan Court required claimants to exhaust previously initiated state proceedings prior to bringing a section 1983 action. Seealro Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
145. 600 F.2d at 267.
146. Id. at 267 n.7.
147. 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979).
148. Id. at 529. Se also Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
149. Clappier was arrested on the evening of May 13, 1975, and it was not until May 16,
1975, that he was brought from his cell for photographing and fingerprinting. During the period between May 13 and May 16, he suffered repeated beatings and rapes inflicted by other
prisoners. Clappier was released on May 16, after the suspension of his $25.00 fine for breach of
the peace. He was taken to Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Denver where he remained for over
four weeks receiving treatment for his injuries, which included a broken jaw. 605 F.2d at 52224.
150. Id. at 524. Since Clappier was a resident of Minnesota, federal jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship. His claim for relief was $75,000.
151. Id at 524-25.
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While the Tenth Circuit had previously decided,' 52 and reaffirmed,
that double recovery, for both negligence and constitutional torts, could not
be permitted, the more difficult problem presented by this case was how the
appellate court should amend the trial court's jury instructions. Wyoming
follows the comparative negligence doctrine 53 in determining the amount
of a defendant's liability whereas comparative negligence is not to be considered in section 1983 actions. The Tenth Circuit court recommended that
special interrogatories be submitted to the jury. If the jury should find the
defendant liable solely on the negligence claim, then the award should be
reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs contributory negligence. If the liability should be based solely on the section 1983 claim, then the full amount of
the assessed damages should be awarded to the plaintiff regardless of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Finally, if liability was found to be based
on both theories, the section 1983 action would prevail, and the plaintiff
54
would receive the total award of damages.'
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision concerning
the degree of proof required to establish a section 1983 violation. The trial
court had instructed the jury that the test of whether the plaintiff suffered
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment was
"whether the assault, as determined by you, is sufficiently severe in the circumstances to shock the conscience of a reasonable person."' 155 The Tenth
Circuit court held that the proper instruction for a jury considering a claim
of cruel and unusual punishment, where there is an act of omission, is that
there must be a showing of "exceptional circumstances and conduct so
grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
156
be intolerable to basic fairness."'
III.
A.

INDIAN RIGHTS

Preferential Treatment Is Not Reverse Discrimination

In Livingston v. Ewtng,' 57 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
New Mexico policy which permitted Indians to display and sell arts and
crafts on the grounds of designated public buildings, but which prohibited
non-Indians from doing the same, was constitutionally valid. The plaintiffs,
non-Indians seeking to sell jewelry in the restricted area, challenged a policy
of the Board of Regents of the New Mexicok Museum at Sante Fe' 58 and a
resolution of the city of Sante Fe t59 which authorized the exclusionary practices.
152. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
153. Defendant had charged that Clappier was negligent for failing to report his beatings to
the authorities at the jail. 605 F.2d at 524.
154. Id. at 530.
155. Id. at 533.
156. Id. See alsoDewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).

157. 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979).
158. Id. at 11 11. The state policy allowed the area under the museum portal to be used for
merchandise display for arts and crafts handmade by Indians.
159. Id. at 1111-12. The city resolution prohibited sales by persons other than Indians
within 50 feet of any established business which sold Indian handcrafted jewelry.
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The aggrieved merchants' claim was based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The New Mexico officials, and the
intervening Indians, responded that there was a rational basis for the preferential treatment. Defendants noted that the state and city officials knew of
the unique historical and cultural aspects of the city and of the Indian heritage. In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit court found that the
classification was permissible under the preferential treatment of indians section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.160 The court of appeals concluded that
because the business area was "on or near an Indian reservation" within the
meaning of the statute, the state action giving preferential treatment to Indi16 1
ans was lawful.
B.

Tribal Sovere'gnty

In Joe v. Marcum, 162 the Tenth Circuit court held that the Navajo Indian
Tribe is a sovereign entity possessing the right of self-government, including
the right to prohibit garnishment of Indians who live and work on reservations. The wages of Tom Joe, a Navajo living and working on a reservation
in New Mexico, were garnished because of Joe's failure to repay a loan from
63
the United States Life Credit Corporation.1 A writ of garnishment, seeking twenty-five percent of Joe's weekly salary, was served on Joe's employer.
Joe sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico claiming that the local court lacked the
jurisdictional authority to garnish Indian wages and that the garnishment
164
Writing for the
was a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Tenth Circuit court, Judge McWilliams noted that the Navajo Tribe has an
extensive system of self-government, including a judicial system consisting of
65
district courts, a court of appeals, and a supreme court.1 The judge recognized that the tribal code provides a means for enforcing judgments, a means
other than garnishment. As garnishment is a statutory remedy permitted in
some jurisdictions and prohibited in others, the appeals court reasoned that
the Navajo Tribe, like any other independent state, had the right to accept
or reject garnishment as a post-judgment remedy.66
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976) provides that nothing in the 1964 Civil Rights Act should
be seen as applying to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation because of
preferential treatment given to a person because he or she is an Indian living on or near a
reservation.
161. 601 F.2d at 1115-16. The appeals court also found that claimants had failed to establish reverse discrimination within the meaning of Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Id.
162. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
163. Id. at 360.
164. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the federal court did not have jurisdiction, but
the Tenth Circuit court disagreed, finding that Joe had several bases for invoking federal jurisdiction, including 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the commerce
clause and the treaty clause. Id. at 361.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 361-62.
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IV.

A.

CASE DIGESTS

Laetrile Availabih'ty

167
appeared, for the third time, 168
The case of Rutherfordv. United States
before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals this term, after a reversal and
remand by the Supreme Court.' 6 9 The final issues before the Tenth Circuit
court were: 1) whether terminally ill cancer patients have a constitutional
right to privacy which allows them to take whatever treatment they desire,
regardless of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification; 2)
whether the proponents of laetrile had met the necessary premarketing procedures of the FDA; and 3) whether laetrile'comes under the grandfather
provisions of the FDA legislation. 1 70 Chief Judge Seth, writing for the appeals court, answered each of these questions in the negative, apparently
finalizing the protracted litigation.'71

B.

The Commerce Clause

The State of Oklahoma, in its second attempt,' 71 2 failed to convince the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold a section of the Oklahoma Waste
Disposal Act' 7 3 in Hardage v. Alkins. 174 The Oklahoma law prohibited the
shipment of controlled industrial waste into Oklahoma unless the state of
origin had standards for the disposal of industrial waste which were substantially similar to those of Oklahoma. A further requirement was that the
state of origin must have entered into a reciprocity agreement with
Oklahoma.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had held that the
75
mandatory reciprocity clause of the statute violated the commerce clause. 1
On subsequent appeal, Oklahoma argued that the provision requiring the
state of origin to have standards similar to those of Oklahoma differed from
the mandatory reciprocity requirement and should, therefore, be held constitutional. Judge Doyle, writing for the court, disagreed. Reasoning that
167. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 336 (1980).
168. See Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. United
States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
169. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court decision see United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions, Sixth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 337, 341-43 (1980).

170. 21 U.S.C. §

32

1(p)(1) (1976).

171. 616 F.2d at 457. The case was remanded to the district court without directions or any
indication as to what issues remained to be decided.
172. Oklahoma originally sought to have the statute validated in Hardage v. Atkins, 582
F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
173. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2764 (Supp. 1978) states:
The [Controlled Industrial Waste Management Section] shall disapprove any plan
which entails the shipping of controlled industrial waste into the State of Oklahoma,
unless the state of origin has enacted substantially similar standards for controlled
industrial waste disposal as, and has entered into a reciprocity agreement with, the
State of Oklahoma. The determination as to whether or not the state of origin has
substantially similar standards for controlled industrial waste disposal is to be made by
the Director of the [Controlled Industrial Waste Management Section], and all reciprocity agreements must be approved and signed by the Governor of Oklahoma.
174. 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
175. Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
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Oklahoma may not force other states to enact legislation as a means of
avoiding economic isolation, the judge found that both statutory provisions
176
imposed a mandatory scheme in violation of the commerce clause.
C.

Abortion Fundtng

A Utah statute, 177 which permitted public assistance funds to be used
for abortions only if the life of the mother was endangered, was ruled unconstitutional in D.R. v. Mtchell.178 The trial court found that the Utah statute
was constitutional, reasoning that the law merely articulated the standard
79
for determining whether an abortion was therapeutic or nontherapeutic.'
The trial court noted that such classifications had been upheld in several
Supreme Court cases.' 80 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion
written by Chief Judge Seth, disagreed with the district court, stating that
"therapeutic" must be equated with "medically necessary" and that there
may be any number of circumstances which, although not life endangering,
18
may be medically necessary to preserve the health of the mother. '
18 2
In view of the recent Supreme Court decision of Harris v. McCrae,
however, the Mitchell decision is of questionable precedential value. In the
Harrs decision, the Supreme Court upheld the federal Hyde Amendment,i 8 3 which is similar in language to the Utah statute, except that the
Hyde Amendment permits federal funds to be used for abortions in cases of
rape as well as when the life of the mother is endangered. The Supreme
Court held also that states are not required by the constitution to provide
84
public funding for abortions.'
Maty H Hurley
Charles E Stuart

176. 619 F.2d at 873.
177. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979) provides:
The department shall not provide any public assistance for medical, hospital or other
medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons where the purpose of such assistance is for the performance of an abortion, unless the life of the
mother would be endangered if an abortion is not performed.
178. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
179. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
180. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. 617 F.2d at 205.
182. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
183. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). See also Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93
Stat. 662 (1979).
184.

100 S. Ct. at 2685.

